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 All advanced democracies struggle with fiscal pressures but Japan stands out 
for its slow rate of economic growth and aging population. As a recent OECD report 
summarizes, “Gross government debt has risen to 226% of GDP, the highest in the 
OECD, driven by rising social spending and inadequate revenues. Rapid population 
ageing is putting continued pressure on public spending.” (OECD 2015: 4). Payment 
on the national debt consumed nearly one-quarter of the budget for FY2016 (MOF 
2016: 5) and continues to mount inexorably despite interest rates approaching zero. 
Not surprisingly, how best to address this fiscal time bomb is the subject of heated 
economic and political debate: How much should the government try to restrain or 
even reduce government spending? When will the economy be strong enough to 
withstand fiscal consolidation? Most experts in public finance agree, however, that 
while control of expenditures also will be necessary, tax increases are unavoidable.
 Controversy also envelops the question of the exact balance of taxes to increase. 
On one end of the ideological spectrum, the Japan Communist Party (JSP) calls for 
raising estate taxes and corporate and individual income taxes. On the other, the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wants to decrease corporate income taxes so 
as to bolster the ability of Japanese companies to compete internationally and to 
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encourage them to invest at home rather than off-shoring activities to countries with 
lower tax rates. 
 Yet here again the appearance of conflict can obscure an emerging consensus. 
After long and contentious debates, political leaders came to accept the advice of 
economists that increasing the rate of the consumption tax must play a central role 
in the effort to bring Japan’s public finances back into balance (Noble 2011; Noble 
2014). Large-scale consumption taxes, known as value-added taxes (VAT) in Europe 
and as Goods and Services taxes (GST) in Canada, Australia and many other former 
British colonies, possess a number of attractive qualities. A VAT raises prodigious 
amounts of revenue efficiently and with less evasion or corruption than most 
other taxes. It does not discriminate across economic activities (that is, it is non-
distortionary), does little to discourage work and investment, and actively promotes 
saving. Unlike corporate or personal income taxes, it is stable across the business 
cycle and applies relatively equally to all age groups (generational equity).  It does 
not, contrary to some fears, contribute to growth in the size of government (Lee et 
al. 2013). Moreover, since the rate of the consumption tax ( 消費税 ) in Japan is still 
far lower than in European countries (as of February 2016, 8% versus 20% or more), 
raising rates looks to be economically feasible. 
 That said, ideas that make sense economically are not always palatable 
politically. Large-scale consumption taxes are subject to one major criticism: they 
are highly regressive, since poor people consume a higher share of their income 
than do rich people. One defense is that the revenues raised by the consumption 
tax support government expenditures which disproportionally help the poor, such 
as national pensions and public health care. Outside of northern Europe, with its 
extensive welfare states, however, such arguments are not likely to be fully accepted. 
An alternative approach is to sweeten the medicine with reduced tax rates (軽減税率) 
on necessities such as food; some countries add health care and education expenses 
to this mix. The drawback to reduced tax rates is that they are inherently messy 
(distinguishing among “food,” “take-out food,” and “restaurant meals,” for example, 
is a perennial headache) and can severely cut into revenue, thus undermining the 
whole point of the tax. Despite its acknowledged merits, instituting or increasing a 
consumption tax can be a tough sell politically.
 This paper asks, “Under which conditions does the public view consumption 
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taxes as tolerable?”. Most people do not want to pay more in taxes, but we 
demonstrate that support for—or at least acquiescence to—future hikes breaks 
down on demographic grounds that correlate with expected costs and benefits. 
Using public opinion data from three major Japanese newspapers, we find that tax 
tolerance increases with age, as the elderly are the main beneficiaries of government 
programs that the taxes are used to fund. Opposition to the consumption tax, on the 
other hand, is related to gender: women, who make more consumption decisions 
and thus are more sensitive to price changes, tend to register lower support than 
men. In the remaining sections, we review the literature on taxation design and 
public opinion that underlies our thesis, discuss the recent political history of taxes 
in Japan, and describe our methodology and results. 
Tax increases and budgetary control: Bureaucratic delegation 
and partisan pacts
 Tax increases pose a number of challenges to political actors. On the one 
hand, they can reduce the discretionary income of voters and worsen perceptions 
of economic wellbeing, leading to a public opinion backlash. On the other hand, 
taxes are crucial to the fiscal viability of public goods provision. Voters may not take 
kindly to governments that slash social insurance programs, such as national health 
care or pensions. This fiscal tradeoff has become increasingly acute in advanced 
industrialized economies that face an aging population with mounting social 
insurance costs and a shrinking taxpayer base. 
 Surprisingly little research has looked specifically at efforts to raise taxes to 
address persistent budget deficits. Important clues are available, however, from 
broader studies of the techniques utilized by advanced democracies to restore 
budgetary balance. Based on the experience of many European countries, Hallerberg 
et al. (2009) posit two approaches in parliamentary democracies. If one party enjoys 
a majority in the legislature, it can delegate to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
confident that the ministry will follow the broad direction of the cabinet, while 
shielding party leaders from direct responsibility for implementing painful measures. 
Mulas-Granados (2006) adds that austerity measures are most likely if the ruling 
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party is committed to budget balance, relatively united ideologically, and still some 
ways from an election. 
 If, however, no party controls a stable majority in the legislature, delegation to 
the Finance Ministry becomes more difficult, since the party controlling the finance 
portfolio cannot be trusted to act totally impartially. The alternative, then, Hallerberg 
et al. (2009) suggest, is for the parties to enter “partisan pacts” that specify the 
austerity measures in some detail, ensuring that at least some of the interests of each 
party are protected, and that blame for the pain can be diffused among the parties. 
Both of these approaches imply that parties are the crucial actors and that they 
operate under considerable pressure from voters.
Tax increases in Japan: Possible but politically risky
 The experience of Japan is broadly consistent with these two models, but 
highlights the political risks attending either approach. Table 1 sketches the postwar 
history of the consumption tax, beginning with Prime Minister Ohira’s first proposal 
in 1978. Its eventual introduction in 1989 followed model one: the leadership of the 
ruling LDP delegated authority to devise and implement a large-scale consumption 
tax to the Ministry of Finance. Indeed, Kato (2003) highlights the active and 
persistent role played by the MOF, with its broad jurisdiction, technical capacity, and 
ability to strategically share information about economic conditions and likely effects 
of new taxes. The introduction of the new consumption tax in 1989 proved a pyrrhic 
victory, however. Discontent with the new tax combined with a number of scandals 
to deprive the LDP of a majority in the summer 1989 elections to the House of 
Councillors (the upper house of the Japanese Diet). After 1989, the LDP was forced 
to enter a series of coalition cabinets in order to secure a majority in both houses 
of the Diet. Nor was the modest 3% tax sufficient to address Japan’s long-term fiscal 
woes. The government succeeded in eliminating the budget deficit for a couple of 
years, but the bursting of Japan’s financial bubble in 1990 delivered a body blow to 
revenue from corporate and personal income taxes, and the deficit soon reemerged. 
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 With the end of majority party cabinets, subsequent political leaders hoping to 
increase the consumption tax rate had to rely on model two: partisan pacts. In the 
fall of 1994 an odd-fellows coalition cabinet dominated by the LDP but headed by 
Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan Socialist Party and including the reformist Sakigake 
Party passed a bill to increase the consumption tax to 5%, but with a two and half 
year delay. A June 1996 meeting of the coalition cabinet, now headed by the LDP’s 
Hashimoto Ryutaro, confirmed the decision despite growing concerns about the state 
TABLE 1: Japanese Consumption Tax Chronology
Year Event Political and economic environment 
1978 Prime Minister Ohira suggests consumption tax LDP suffers in 1979 election 
1986  Nakasone cabinet suggests, then retracts CT LDP wins big in 1986 HoR election  
1989 Takeshita cabinet passes 3% CT bill 1988, takes effect from 
1989 
LDP stumbles in 1989 HoC election, 
loses control of HoC 
1994 Non-LDP PM Hosokawa abruptly suggests replacing CT 
with 7% “national welfare tax,” meets ferocious opposition, 
abruptly withdraws. LDP-dominated coalition headed by 
Socialist Murayama Tomiichi passes bill to increase rate to 
5%, economic conditions permitting. 
Opposition loses unity, control of HoR 
in 1994, but performs well in 1995 
HoC election; LDP forced to rely on 
coalition cabinet led by JSP head 
Murayama 
1997 Hashimoto’s LDP cabinet implements increase to 5%, of 
which 1% is assigned to local governments; justified as 
strengthening social security 
Economy stumbles; LDP performs 
badly again in 1998 HoC election 
2007 LDP fiscal reform report calls for increasing CT to 10% by 
mid-2010s 
 
2009 DPJ manifesto proclaims no CT increase within HoR term “Lehman Shock” hammers Japanese 
economy, weakens LDP; DPJ wins 
gigantic HoR victory, forms cabinet 
2010 DPJ Finance Minister Kan in international meetings 
commits Japan to fiscal rebalancing; LDP manifesto calls 
for increasing CT to about 10%; new PM Kan immediately 
concurs, against opposition within DPJ 
DPJ badly loses in HoC election; PM 
Kan weakened, but hangs on to deal 
with March 11 earthquake and tsunami 
disaster 
2012 PM Noda gets Cabinet approval of, and introduces into 
Diet, package of eight tax and welfare bills (March); signs 
three-party agreement (June); revised bills pass HoR (June) 
and HoC (August) 
DPJ suffers defections from Ozawa 
group then devastating defeat in Dec. 
2012 HoR election  
2013 Abe’s LDP cabinet hesitates, then reaffirms (Oct.) CT 
increase to 8% 
Monetary and fiscal stimulus 
(“Abenomics”) revs up stock market; 
HoC election: LDP-Komeito coalition 
victory ends “divided Diet” 
2014 Increase to 8% takes effect (April 1); Increase to 10% Abe calls snap election to HoR: LDP 
postponed (Nov.) crushes DPJ (Dec.) 
2016  HoC election scheduled (summer) 
2017 CT scheduled to increase to 10% (April)  
2017
- 
Further increases in CT rate likely (Cf. OECD 2015)  
Source: Revised and updated from Noble (2014) 
CT: Consumption tax. HoR: House of Representatives. HoC: House of Councillors (upper house).
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of the economy. By the time the increase took effect in 1997, Hashimoto headed 
a majority cabinet (although the LDP relied on informal cooperation from some 
opposition parties) and the LDP bore the brunt of popular dissatisfaction over the 
tax increase and weak economic conditions, suffering a severe drubbing in the July, 
1998 House of Councillors election (Curtis 1999: 129-131). 
 Despite this second painful electoral setback, after a decade of bitter debate, 
LDP leaders reluctantly concluded that the consumption tax would have to rise to 
at least 10% (Noble 2011). The final push for a new partisan pact came, however, 
not from the LDP but from the Democrats, who won a smashing victory in the 2009 
House of Representatives election. The DPJ’s electoral manifesto had promised no 
consumption tax hikes before the end of the Diet term, but after the eruption of 
the Greek financial crisis rekindled international concerns about heavily indebted 
governments, DPJ leaders committed to raising the tax. In 2012, the DPJ, LDP and 
Komeito signed a three-party pact to raise the tax to 10% in two stages (Noble 2014). 
Two 10-page documents outlined agreements and commitments to work out further 
agreements in a number of areas, especially reduced tax rates on food and possibly 
other items, a necessary concession to the consumer-oriented Komeito (DPJ 2012a, 
DPJ 2012b). Despite gaining some cover from the other two parties, the political 
consequences for the DPJ as the prime mover were nothing short of catastrophic: 
dozens of DPJ MPs deserted the party, and whereas the DPJ had won 300 seats in 
the 2009 House of Representatives election, it could muster only 57 seats in 2012. 
 After a brief hesitation, the new LDP prime minister, Abe Shinzo, implemented 
the first stage increase to 8% as planned. The next scheduled election was still far off 
and the DPJ was still reeling from its electoral shellacking. Raising the consumption 
tax imposed a greater blow than expected to Japan’s shaky economy, however. In 
late 2014 Abe announced that he would delay the increase to 10% and called a snap 
election, ostensibly to ratify the delay. The opposition remained weak, voters were 
happy to delay the tax hike, and the LDP won another massive victory (Pekkanen, 
Reed, and Scheiner, eds. 2016). After extensive deliberations with Komeito, in late 
2015 Abe agreed to keep the tax rate on both fresh and processed foods (but not 
alcohol or restaurant meals) at 8%, thus reducing the expected new revenues by 
about one-fifth or roughly one trillion yen. Once again, it seemed, partisan pacts 
had proved their worth. On the other hand, repeated electoral defeats after each 
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attempt to institute or increase the consumption tax, and political success after 
postponing increases, raised again a pressing question: how could political leaders 
craft messages to elicit support for necessary tax increases, and who would be most 
amenable to accepting those messages? 
Who tolerates what types of taxes? Hints from the existing 
literature
 Existing research on attitudes toward taxation and government expenditures, 
though thin and fragmentary, provides some clues. Broadly speaking, there are two 
approaches to understanding variation—over time and between subpopulations—
in tax tolerance. The first, drawing from constructivist theories, is whether the tax 
system accords with societal norms regarding the “fairness” of the tax burden. Two 
common ideals are that those with the ability and means to pay more should do 
so, and that the tax code should be enforced fairly. A study from the Pew Research 
Center (2015) shows strong support for the notion that corporations and the rich 
should pay their fair share, although in the American context, richer respondents 
also want assurance that the tax burden will apply to the poor as well. The second 
line of investigation is to disaggregate individual-level incentives in terms taxation’s
costs and benefits. Tax increases are rarely debated in isolation; legislators try 
to sell them as a way to pay for popular social programs and national priorities, 
such as pensions or disaster relief. We would expect, then, that tolerance for taxes 
should vary with the “tax-benefit link”: the net balance between taxes paid in to the 
government and the benefits paid out via various transfers programs.
 Let us first turn to the constructivist approach, regarding the fairness of the tax 
code. This norm undergirds support for progressive taxation, where the marginal 
rate increases with wealth or income, rather than regressive taxes, whose burden 
falls more heavily on the poor. Franko et al. (2013) find that people who are 
ideologically concerned about inequality or support such a party tend to be more 
in favor of tax increases generally. In the Japanese case, much of the public seems 
to harbor serious concerns about the distributive nature of the tax system overall. 
Three major newspapers, the Mainichi, Asahi, and Yomiuri, periodically conduct 
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surveys on taxation, with one question being, “Do you believe the current system of 
taxation is fair, or that it is unfair?”1） As Table 2 shows, a consistent supermajority 
of respondents has favored the latter response. 
 What aspects of the tax system prompt this concern? Two surveys by the 
Yomiuri, listed in Table 3, point to possible clues. When asked, “Please identify 
issues that you feel are unfair about taxation” (multiple responses possible)2）, the 
most common answers reference unequal tax burdens, as manifested in two ways. 
The first is biases in the tax code itself. The plurality response in both surveys is that 
religious entities benefit from favorable tax exemptions (38.2% in 1998, 37.4% in 
2001), while an additional 20.1% / 25.9% object to tax breaks for the high-income 
elderly (aged 65+). The second type of unfairness concerns the implementation of the 
tax code. Two frequent complaints are that businesses are pocketing consumption 
tax payments that should be going to the government (33.8% in 1998, 37.2% in 
2001), and independent businesses are better able to hide their income and avoid 
their full tax burden than are regular salarymen (32.5% / 34.9%). 
TABLE 2: 
“Do you believe the current system of taxation is fair, or that it is unfair?”
 Dec 1977 (M) 
Sep 1979 
(M) 
Sep 1988 
(M) 
Feb 1989 
(Y) 
Mar 1994 
(A) 
Dec 1998 
(M) 
Jan 2002 
(A) 
Fair 12 12 13 15 16 15 22 
Unfair 84 83 72 79 73 80 66 
Sources: M = Mainichi, Y = Yomiuri, A = Asahi surveys 
1）While exact wordings vary over time, the prototypical question, in the original Japanese, asks, “ いまの
税金のかけ方は公平だと思いますか．不公平だと思いますか．” All translations here and in the rest of this 
paper are by the authors. 
2）Original wording: “ 税金について，あなたが不公平だと感じているものがあれば，いくつでもあげて下さい．”
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 One of the benefits of consumption taxes (CT) is that they can mitigate 
perceptions of tax bias, as they are difficult for consumers to avoid. As Table 3 
shows, many Japanese people are concerned with exemptions—either in the tax 
code itself or in its implementation—that do not benefit the modal household. 
That said, the CT is also regressive, a sentiment that the public shares. The Asahi 
conducted polls on the desirability of the consumption tax in September 1989, five 
months after its original establishment, and in March 1994, after the Hosokawa 
Cabinet proposed a 7% “national welfare tax”. The surveys reveal concerns about 
two types of regressivity. The first is related to CT implementation, mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph. In the 3/6/1994 survey, 39% of respondents, when asked 
to identify the biggest problem with consumption taxes, replied that they were 
worried that their payments were not reaching the government.3） In an earlier 
poll in 9/16/1989 (Asahi), 18% responded the same. While consumers must pay 
the consumption tax, they doubt whether businesses are properly audited and 
monitored for compliance. If not, then the CT acts as a net transfer from consumers 
to producers, especially independent businesses that have historically faced weaker 
TABLE 3: Yomiuri Newspaper Surveys
“Please identify issues that you feel are unfair about taxation” 
(multiple responses permitted)
Responses 11/28/1998 12/13/2001 
Religious organizations receive favorable tax rates 38.2% 37.4% 
Businesses are delinquent in paying consumption taxes 33.8% 37.2% 
Independent businesses are better able to avoid taxes than salarymen 32.5% 34.9% 
High-income elderly (age 65+) receive favorable tax rates 20.1% 25.9% 
Estate tax is too high 22.1% 23.5% 
Corporations that suffer losses do not have to pay corporate taxes 11.8% 16.7% 
Low-income workers do not have to pay any income taxes 13.7% 15.9% 
Nothing in particular 15.6% 14.6% 
Too many exemptions for dependents 7.3% 7.9% 
N/A 3.7% 3.6% 
Other 0.6% 0.7% 
3）Original wording: “ 払った税金が国に届いているかわからない ”
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tax scrutiny from the government. This issue of trust in the government is consistent 
with earlier studies, including those by Lacy (1998) and Yamamura (2014) which find 
that tax tolerance is consistent with the belief that the state will use those revenues 
efficiently.
 The second dimension of regressivity, which rears its head frequently in CT 
debates, is the uniformity of the tax rate. While flat taxes are “fair” in that the 
same standard applies to everybody, the real burden in terms of tax costs relative 
to income falls more heavily on the poor. In the 1994 Asahi poll, the foremost 
concern was that daily necessities such as fresh foods  were taxed at the same rate 
as everything else; in 9/16/1989, 27% listed the same. Unsurprisingly, this concern 
is particularly concentrated among the poor. In a similar 12/2/1993 Yomiuri poll, 
support vs. opposition to a consumption tax hike was split 48-48% among those 
whose income exceeded ¥10 million. Among those in the ¥2-4 million bracket, 
opposition rose to 74%, and for the sub-¥2 million bracket, it was 76%. 
The costs and benefits of taxation
 Thus far, our discussion has centered on norms and perceptions regarding the 
tax burden. However, political actors rarely debate the CT only in terms of its costs. 
Instead, it is justified as a necessary evil to maintain the solvency of government 
programs. The public at large seems to accept this tradeoff. A 7/24/2008 Asahi poll 
asked, “Should the declining birthrate and aging population render social insurance 
finances insufficient, how should the costs be paid for?”4） The most popular 
response was to raise the CT (33%), outpolling increases to the income or corporate 
tax (25%), an increase in insurance rates (4%), or a reduction of social insurance 
services (16%). That said, it is unreasonable to expect norms to be accepted 
equally by all persons, or for norms to necessarily outweigh individual cost-benefit 
calculations. The real task, then, is to decipher the conditions under which we 
should observe greater tolerance for the consumption tax. 
4）Original wording: “ 少子高齢化が進んで社会保障の財源が足りなくなった場合，どうやって費用をまかなう
べきだと思いますか ”
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 The existing literature, as well as our public opinion snapshots above, suggests 
that there are two major factors. First, the Japanese public should be amenable to 
a less regressive CT, such as those that lower the rate for daily necessities. Second, 
they are more likely to back tax increases that are described as crucial to the 
survival of popular social insurance programs. As Franko et al. (2013) and Lacy (2014) 
find, people are more tolerant of taxes when they believe they are likely to benefit 
from the additional revenue. 
 Systematic analysis requires individual-level polling data, but in this paper, 
we take advantage of different ways in which questions about the CT are asked 
in public opinion polls. Specifically, we examine temporal and cross-sectional 
differences using survey data from three major Japanese newspapers: the Asahi, 
Yomiuri, and Mainichi. Each periodically queries voters about their opinions on the 
tax system. Some ask about the general “fairness” of taxes (as discussed in Tables 2 
and 3), while others poll about a specific policy decision, such as raising the CT at 
some fixed date. Our analysis focuses on the latter set of questions. Voters’ interest 
in and knowledge about tax rates are more likely to be heightened when the issue 
is debated in the Diet and discussed regularly in newspapers, thus making the 
responses more meaningful as measures of social preferences. 
 Although individual question wordings change over time, we focus on three 
archetypes that appear regularly. The first, “simple” wording asks respondents 
whether they support or oppose an increase in the CT. Exact wordings can vary: 
most but not all mention a specific percentage for the new CT rate and note the 
proposing party or prime minister.5） The second, “tradeoff” question prefaces 
changes to the CT with its purported purpose. One typical example is, “What do you 
think about the idea of raising the consumption tax rate to finance social insurance 
programs, such as pensions?” (Mainichi 10/11/2013)6） While most “tradeoff” 
questions include a reference to social insurance, a minority mentions other 
programs, such as disaster reconstruction after 3.11 (e.g. Mainichi 4/16/2011) or 
5）This type of contextualizing information is more common in surveys that are taken after the 
government has put forth an explicit tax proposal.
6）Original wording: “ 年金など社会保障の財源として消費税の税率を引き上げる考えについてどう思います
か ”
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reductions in the income tax (e.g. Yomiuri 12/2/1993). 
 While the “simple” and “tradeoff” questions are fundamentally about the same 
policy decision, our third category concerns a distinct issue. “Exemption” questions 
ask respondents whether they support reductions in the consumption tax for specific 
items. The standard framing is, “When raising the consumption tax, one opinion is 
that the rate should be lowered for necessities. Do you agree or disagree?” (Mainichi 
11/9/2013)7） Some surveys give more information about what constitutes “necessities” 
or “ 生 活 必 需 品 ”, including descriptions such as food items. These “exemption” 
questions were particularly common between 2012-2015, after the government 
proposed a two-step CT hike from 5% to 8% and then to 10%.  
 These three question categories give us leverage to investigate four hypotheses. 
The first is straightforward: support for the consumption tax should be greater 
when it is framed as a “tradeoff” to pay for cherished social insurance programs 
or important national priorities. Actual legislation relating to consumption taxes 
rarely restricts how the revenue should be used, and even when it does, the 
targeted programs can be changed by subsequent legislation. However, when 
survey instruments introduce cues such as “social welfare” or “disaster relief”, then 
respondents should be more inclined to accept the tax hike. Concretely, we predict 
that (1) support should be greater in “tradeoff” than “simple” question wordings. 
 That said, every individual’s tax burden and dependence on government 
programs change over time. Ideally, we would test for the relationship between 
tax attitudes and wealth or income, but the major Japanese newspapers do not 
provide regular breakdowns on this dimension. Our strategy instead is to focus on 
demographic correlates of the likely costs and benefits of the consumption tax. The 
literature provides mixed evidence on which demographic groups are most likely to 
support tax increases. Yamamura (2014) finds that trust in government is important 
only for the wealthy, who perceive that they will have to pay a greater share of taxes. 
Lacy (2014: 255) finds that while, “For most of the electorate, dependence on federal 
spending is unrelated to vote choice,” elderly respondents who were relatively 
dependent on government spending were more likely to vote for the Democratic 
7）Original wording: “ 消費税を引き上げる際，生活必需品などに軽減税率を導入すべきだという意見がありま
すが，あなたは賛成ですか，反対ですか ”
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candidate (Barack Obama) in the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Similarly, Ohtake 
and Tomioka (2004) report that poor elderly in Japan are more supportive of 
redistribution. Takegawa’s (2014) surveys turn up a slightly different pattern: while 
younger people in Japan are indeed more reluctant to support government spending 
for social welfare, the middle-aged are actually more supportive than the elderly. 
 At the risk of oversimplifying, we base our analysis of the tax-benefit link on 
a simple assumption: in general, income increases with age, particularly in Japan 
where most firms still structure wages based on seniority. This makes progressive 
taxes, whose marginal rate rises with income levels, less attractive as one becomes 
older, while regressive taxes, especially the consumption tax, becomes less onerous. 
At the same time, reliance on social insurance programs—and thus concerns about 
their fiscal viability—also increases with age. Older age cohorts have budgeted 
pension payouts into their lifetime savings decisions, and they are more likely to be 
dependent on social insurance payments. Younger cohorts, on the other hand, will 
not see the benefits of tax increases for decades, and thus are more likely to discount 
the value of those programs. Even should pension or health insurance disbursements 
be reduced, they still have time to adjust their spending vs. investment mix to 
prepare for a more uncertain future. Our second hypothesis, then, is that (2) support 
for the CT should rise with age, both because its individual costs are marginally less 
and the value of forthcoming benefits is greater. 
 We also propose a third, related hypothesis: (3) older age groups should be less 
supportive of “exemption” proposals, which allow for reduced consumption taxes on 
certain items. The logic is largely identical to that for our third hypothesis. Older age 
cohorts are more likely to prioritize program benefits over tax costs, and as such, 
will be more skeptical about policies that challenge their long-term viability and 
disbursement levels. 
 Finally, we turn to distinctions between the objective vs. subjective costs of 
consumption taxes, whose perception we expect to differ by gender. Evidence on 
gender effects is thinner than that on age, and the causal linkages complex. Most 
studies have focused on the expenditure / benefit side of the equation, rather than 
on the costs. In Norway, surveys show, female voters are more supportive of public 
spending on child and elderly care; unmarried women are especially likely to lean 
left (Finseraas et al. 2012). In the first round of Alvarez and McCaffery’s (2003) 
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survey of attitudes toward how best to handle a potential budget surplus, female 
respondents were more supportive of spending on public goods, but also more 
likely to express no opinion (men were more likely to support tax reductions). After 
the bruising 2000 American presidential campaign, however, a second round of 
surveys revealed that the gender gap had almost disappeared. In Japan, in contrast, 
Takegawa (2010) finds more support for a large welfare state from men than women, 
which suggests that men may be more amenable to higher taxes as well. Clearly the 
significance of age and gender on attitudes toward public taxing and spending are 
worthy of closer investigation, particularly in Japan. 
 Our fourth hypothesis is that women should be less supportive of a consumption 
tax increase than men. We base this claim on modal gender roles in Japanese 
households, where women are often tasked with shopping for daily necessities and 
balancing checkbooks. People who make more consumption decisions, i.e. who shop 
and look at bills frequently, are likely to be better attuned to marginal price changes. 
We predict that this should make Japanese women more likely to place greater 
weight on the costs of the consumption tax than its benefits, and that the gender gap 
should exist whether the consumption tax is sold “simply” or as a “tradeoff”. 
Findings: tax tolerance by age and gender
 The Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi conduct regular monthly surveys on political 
attitudes. We used each newspaper’s article database—Yomidasu (Yomiuri), Kikuzo 
(Asahi), and Maisaku (Mainichi)—to search for surveys pertaining to the tax system. 
We began by searching for “consumption tax”&”opinion polls” ( 消 費 税 & 世 論 調
査 ), but also tried alternative phrasings, such as “consumption tax increase” ( 消費
増税 ). We restrict our analysis to 1985 onwards, when the consumption tax started 
to become a viable, albeit partisan, issue. Mixing and matching different newspaper 
sources increases the number of monthly observations in our dataset, allowing for 
more comprehensive temporal coverage of people’s attitudes towards taxation. 
However, the most valuable surveys are those by the Mainichi, which provides 
demographic breakdowns by age (20s, 30s, etc.) and gender, allowing us to test 
more nuanced hypotheses. 
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 One reasonable concern is whether the survey results are biased by the partisan 
leanings of the newspapers—the Yomiuri is generally considered center-right, the 
Mainichi centrist, and Asahi center-left. We conducted two-sided t-tests of average 
“net support” (support minus opposition) between the three papers, and we detected 
no statistically significant difference.8） As such, we lay aside concerns of survey 
bias for the remaining analysis, although the effects of more nuanced variation in 
question wording deserve more attention in future analyses.
 With the caveats out of the way, let us now turn to the data analysis. Figure 
1 displays the “net support” ratio for either the implementation of a consumption 
tax (pre-1989) or further increases in its rate (post-1989). The incidence of surveys 
is clustered in the post-2004 period, and particularly after 2008. During the entire 
period, there were 59 “simple” questions (solid line) and 62 “tradeoff” versions 
(dashed line). As is apparent, most people are opposed to a tax hike, with survey 
responses largely in negative territory. The highest levels “simple” net support are 
between Jun-Sep 2010, while the lowest are in Apr 1985 and Apr 1996. 
8）Results are available from the authors upon request.
FIGURE 1
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 Hypothesis 1 stated that average support for a consumption tax hike should be 
greater when it is contextualized as a “tradeoff” for social insurance programs, rather 
than when it is asked “simply” with no qualifiers. No survey in our study asked both 
types of questions in the same poll, and so we cannot make direct comparisons of 
wording effects. Instead, we aggregate these polls over time and compare average 
support ratios for each question category. In the time period under observation, the 
mean net support for the CT is -25.2% for “simple” questions and -7.8% for “tradeoff” 
versions. A two-sample t-test reveals that higher support for the latter variety is 
statistically significant at the p<0.001 level (t-statistic = -5.02). This result holds 
even when we test the simple vs. tradeoff differential separately for each newspaper. 
Tentatively, then, we conclude that respondents’ tolerance for consumption taxes is 
greater when they are cued to think of the benefits, i.e. when it is framed as a way 
to protect social insurance programs, than when they are only presented with the 
costs.
 Our second hypothesis suggested that age should influence the objective 
tradeoff between tax costs and benefits. We predict that older age groups should be 
more supportive, because many social insurance disbursements, such as pensions 
and health care subsidies, are designed for post-retirement cohorts. We utilize the 
Mainichi data to examine age differences in support for the consumption tax. The 
Mainichi provides response breakdowns by age decade: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-
59, 60-69, 70-79. For presentational simplicity, we show these in two-decade blocs, 
i.e. 20-39, 40-59, 60+, in Figure 2. While the difference between these cohorts 
waxes and wanes, the 60+ age cohort consistently shows more support for the 
consumption tax than the 20-39 bloc, regardless of question type. The 40-59 group 
lies in between, although it is closer to the older 60+ population. Looking at the data 
more closely, we find that the 20-29 group has the lowest mean support, while the 
70+ cohort is most in favor. Their respective net support is -30.5% vs. -18.5% for 
“simple” questions, and -23.7% vs. -5.0% for “tradeoff” versions. The difference in 
means is statistically significant at the p<0.05 and p<0.01 levels, respectively. 
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 A more intriguing result obtains for our related, third hypothesis. We predict 
that older age groups should be less in favor of “exemptions” to the consumption 
tax, for reasons similar to the second hypothesis. Our results suggest the need for 
greater nuance. Unlike the simple and tradeoff wordings, where support increases 
linearly with age, the distribution for exemption questions is hump shaped. The 
40-59 cohort is most in favor of reducing the consumption tax rate for necessities, 
while the 20-29 and 70+ groups are less supportive. The difference between the 20-
29 and 50-59 group is statistically significant, as is the gap between 70+ and 50-59, 
but the youngest and oldest groups are indistinguishable. We do not have a clear 
explanation for this trend. If responses were determined by the financial viability of 
social insurance benefits, then it would make sense that the elderly are opposed to 
reductions in tax payments, but not why the young are similarly concerned. If the 
main issue were the costs of the consumption tax, then we would expect both groups 
to be opposed: the post-retirement cohort because they are on fixed income, and the 
younger cohort because their income and savings levels are lower. This is clearly a 
puzzle that deserves further exploration, but we leave it for future analysis.
 Our fourth hypothesis posited that women should be less supportive of a rise in 
the consumption tax than men. Its logic is based on the frequency of consumption 
FIGURE 2
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decisions. Under existing gender roles in Japan, women take on most household 
duties, including daily grocery shopping and paying for bills. We predict, then, that 
women will be more sensitive to price increases than men. Figure 3 displays trend 
lines in net support for men and women, separated into two question types: “Simple” 
(left) and “Tradeoff” (right). The Mainichi does not use the “tradeoff” wording until 
March 2004, while the “simple” variant has been used as far back as September 
1979. As such, for visual comparability, we have restricted this figure to March 2004 
onwards, although our statistical analysis utilizes the full panel. 
 
 First, as consistent with our test for Hypothesis 1, the “tradeoff” wording scores 
higher on average than do “simple” questions. The average net support among 
men / women for the former is 3.9% / -15.7%, but for the latter is only -8.7% / 
-30.3%. Second, the gender gap is statistically significant for both survey types. We 
compare the means for net support between men and women with a paired t-test. 
The t-statistic for the difference between men and women is 12.86 for “simple” 
questions and 7.01 for “tradeoff” questions. We can neglect the null hypothesis of no 
difference at the p<0.0001 level. 
 Interestingly, the gender gap does not apply when respondents are asked 
FIGURE 3
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about consumption tax “exemptions” for necessities. While women are slightly in 
favor, with 51.9% net support compared to 48.9% for men, this difference is not 
statistically significant (t=1.32). To a certain extent, this is because women are more 
ambivalent than men on tax issues, with higher proportions of the former answering 
don’t know to survey questions. On “exemption” issues, higher rates of men answer 
either support and oppose, with the gender gap on opposition, which is higher 
among women, being statistically significant (t=3.47).
Conclusion: whither the consumption tax?
 Social scientists have long studied crossnational and intertemporal variation in 
government spending, but less effort has been expended on taxation—the flipside of 
the fiscal coin. Existing analyses have found mixed results, as support for taxation 
is a complicated interaction of varying factors, such as the type of taxation and an 
individual’s income, gender, and age. Our approach, instead, has been to focus on 
the consumption tax specifically and to measure variation in tax tolerance based 
on question wording, looking at demographic breakdowns where the data is 
available. 
 Our main findings, based on surveys from the three major newspapers in Japan 
between 1985-2015, are as follows:
1) Respondents are more supportive of consumption tax increases when they are 
juxtaposed with the need to pay for major social insurance programs.
2) Support increases with age, likely because the elderly place greater value on the 
public goods benefits that the taxes will pay for. 
3) Support is lower among women, likely because they are more sensitized to 
changes in prices.
 Our tests are far from definitive, in part because the available survey data does 
not allow us to tease apart support levels at the level of individuals, across different 
cross-sections (e.g. by wealth or income), or by combinations of demographic 
features (e.g. elderly women vs. elderly men). Acknowledging these limitations, we 
propose some alternative methods of analyzing popular perceptions of taxation’s 
burdens and benefits. 
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 The most obvious approach is to utilize micro-level survey data. One option is 
the Japanese Electoral Study (JES) of individual voters, currently in its fifth iteration. 
Each study, timed around national elections, conducts multiple waves of surveys, 
allowing for panel analyses of attitudes about government spending and taxation, 
trust in government, partisan leanings, and the like. Its main limitation is that we 
cannot gain an accurate perception of tax attitudes at regular intervals. However, 
taxes are often at the heart of election campaigns, increasing the likelihood that 
respondents’ answers are well thought out.
 A different line of research is to leverage monthly surveys by the major 
newspapers on economic and political attitudes. Our paper has extracted polls 
that include specific questions about taxation, but it would be possible to combine 
these with more detailed responses on perceptions about the state of the economy, 
personal finances, and government performance. For example, time-series analyses 
of Jiji Tsushin surveys shows that cabinet approval fluctuates with stock market 
performance (McElwain 2015), but not with inflation rates. One implication is 
that the Japanese public, even while aware of price fluctuations, does not always 
penalize the government for them. This suggests that political actors may not face 
an electoral penalty for a consumption tax hike as long as it does not harm overall 
economic performance or the stock market, the latter of which is increasingly 
dominated by foreign investors who may be more skittish about fiscal health 
than the average voter. We could test this hypothesis by looking at the effects of 
consumption tax debates on the salience of inflation to voters, in combination with 
the data we have gathered here.
 A third strategy is to conduct survey experiments on the effects of question 
wording. We have argued in this paper that cues about the necessity or potential 
benefits of taxation can influence respondents’ attitudes towards taxation. This could 
be tested directly through survey treatments that alter question wording or introduce 
different information about taxation. While expensive, survey experiments provide 
much clearer causal evidence about the effects of treatments on outcomes.
 Taxation and fiscal health are unavoidable, long-term issues that political 
elites and regular citizens alike will have to reckon with. How the public evaluates 
consumption taxes will influence whether and how the government debates and 
legislates on the matter. As such, we consider it to be an issue that deserves greater 
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analysis, both theoretically and empirically, and we hope that this paper provides 
some insights that will help to promote this topic more broadly.
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